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Jane LambertSignificant deadlines have come and gone in October almost without being noticed. One was 15 which was supposed to be the last opportunity for the text of a treaty on the new relationship with the EU to have been ratified by the Council and the European and British parliaments, The other was 31 when a reply to the letter of formal notice on the UK's alleged breach of the EU withdrawal agreement mentioned in the press release of 1 Oct 2020 should have been received.
The reason why those deadlines have been largely overlooked is that the election in the USA is more likely to affect the UK's relationship with the EU27 in the long term than anything that Monsieur Barnier or Lord Frost or even their political masters or mistresses are likely to say or do. That is because Mr Biden and Mr Trump have very different views of the world and, accordingly, of the US's relationship with the UK.
Mr Biden was the Vice-President of an administration that negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership which was signed on 4 Feb 2016. Mr Trump withdrew from that accord very shortly after he became President of the USA. Similatrly, Mr Biden was part of an administration that negotiated with the EU to establish a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Though there had been objections to that agreement in several member states including the UK, it was the Trump administration that pulled out of those talks. Mr Trump has shown no time for trade blocs. He prefers bilateral deals where the USA can more or less dictate terms because of its overwhelming bargaining power.
If, which now seems unlikely, Mr Trump has won the 2020 election the UK will probably get a bilateral trade deal with the USA. That might not make much difference to the UK's economy but it may be perceived by some as strengthening the hand of the British negotiators in their dealings with the EU. If Mr Biden has won the UK may find itself at the back of the queue for a bilateral trade deal as President Obama warned in the brexit referendum campaign. That would not be because of any antipathy towards the UK but because it has a smaller market than the EU27, the TPP or indeed China and Japan. When the UK was a member state of the EU it was useful to a multilateralist administration because the UK exercised some leverage as one of the big three member states. By leaving the EU it has abandoned that leverage and hence much of its usefulness to a Biden administration. Should Biden reopen trade talks with the EU for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership mark 2, the only way the UK could access the US market on preferential terms would be by joining those negotiations which would be tantamount to rejoining the EU.
The only other noteworthy event in October was the signing in Tokyo of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan. In An Introduction to and Overview of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan 28 Oct 2020 I compared its structure to the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and found very little difference.
Anyone wishing to discuss this article or any of the topics mentioned in it may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.
The reason why those deadlines have been largely overlooked is that the election in the USA is more likely to affect the UK's relationship with the EU27 in the long term than anything that Monsieur Barnier or Lord Frost or even their political masters or mistresses are likely to say or do. That is because Mr Biden and Mr Trump have very different views of the world and, accordingly, of the US's relationship with the UK.
Mr Biden was the Vice-President of an administration that negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership which was signed on 4 Feb 2016. Mr Trump withdrew from that accord very shortly after he became President of the USA. Similatrly, Mr Biden was part of an administration that negotiated with the EU to establish a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Though there had been objections to that agreement in several member states including the UK, it was the Trump administration that pulled out of those talks. Mr Trump has shown no time for trade blocs. He prefers bilateral deals where the USA can more or less dictate terms because of its overwhelming bargaining power.
If, which now seems unlikely, Mr Trump has won the 2020 election the UK will probably get a bilateral trade deal with the USA. That might not make much difference to the UK's economy but it may be perceived by some as strengthening the hand of the British negotiators in their dealings with the EU. If Mr Biden has won the UK may find itself at the back of the queue for a bilateral trade deal as President Obama warned in the brexit referendum campaign. That would not be because of any antipathy towards the UK but because it has a smaller market than the EU27, the TPP or indeed China and Japan. When the UK was a member state of the EU it was useful to a multilateralist administration because the UK exercised some leverage as one of the big three member states. By leaving the EU it has abandoned that leverage and hence much of its usefulness to a Biden administration. Should Biden reopen trade talks with the EU for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership mark 2, the only way the UK could access the US market on preferential terms would be by joining those negotiations which would be tantamount to rejoining the EU.
The only other noteworthy event in October was the signing in Tokyo of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan. In An Introduction to and Overview of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan 28 Oct 2020 I compared its structure to the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and found very little difference.
Anyone wishing to discuss this article or any of the topics mentioned in it may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.
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