No Deal Preparations on Each Side of the Channel

Jane Lambert

Yesterday I was snowed under with a blizzard of emails from our own government setting out its preparations for "no deal".  Though they arrived the day after the cabinet had announced an intensification of preparations for a departure without a withdrawal agreement it was obvious that they had been planned if not written a good deal earlier.

Although I ploughed through all those emails I selected three that are likely to be of interest to my readers:

• Producing food products protected by a ‘geographical indication’ if there’s no Brexit deal;
• Existing free trade agreements if there’s no Brexit deal; and 
• Trade remedies if there's no Brexit deal.

The first of those emails updates guidance which was first published on 24 Sept 2018 which I mentioned in Geographical Indications over Brexit 6 Oct 2918 NIPC Branding.  The email gives more details of the new British scheme for protecting geographical indications which will be published shortly including the new logo and the protection that UK producers can expect in the remaining states and EU producers in the UK after 29 March 2019.  I shall offer seminars on the new British system at our chambers in London and Birmingham during the New Year,

The second states that HM government will try to negotiate bilateral agreements with third countries that replicate those countries' arrangements with the EU as soon as possible after Brexit.  Until these are agreed the United Kingdom will rely on "most favoured nation" terms.

Finally, a new quango is to be set up by the name of the Trade Remedies Authority which will investigate complaints of dumping and unfair practices. The guidance does not say what will be done if the quango finds an unfair trading practice but Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement provides for consultations. references to dispute settlement panels and corrective measures.

I also received a succinct Communication from the Commission to the European institutions preparing for the withdrawal of the UK from the EU on 30 March 2019 and implementing the Commission’s Contingency Action Plan.  The Communication discusses the Action Plan and sets out the following principles for contingency measures:

• "Contingency measures should not replicate the benefits of membership of the Union, nor the terms of any transition period, as provided for in the draft Withdrawal Agreement; 
• They should be temporary in nature. For the measures adopted today, the Commission has, where relevant, proposed time limitations which are a function of the specific situation in the sector concerned;
• They should be adopted unilaterally by the European Union in pursuit of its interests and should be revocable at any time; 
• They should respect the division of competencies provided for by the Treaties; 
• National contingency measures should be compatible with EU law; 
• They should not remedy delays that could have been avoided by preparedness measures and timely action by the relevant stakeholders."

The Communications addresses citizens; rights, financial services, air traffic, road haulage, customs and climate change policy.

Anyone wishing to discuss this article or Brexit generally should call me on 020 7404 5252 or send me a message through my contact page. 

Sometimes it is a Good Thing to ignore Referendums

Jane Lambert

The Prime Minister's response to growing calls in her party and the nation for a "Peoples' Vote" or second referendum is that it would somehow "break faith with the British people" (see Brexit: May to urge MPs not to 'break faith' by demanding people's vote 17 Dec 2018 The Guardian).  In my article The Western Australian Secession Referendum - A Precedent for Dealing with Troublesome Referendums? (17 Dec 2018 NIPC Brexit) I wrote that a select committee of 3 peers and 3 MPs recommended that Parliament should not even consider the result of a referendum in which almost all eligible voters had participated and where the majority was 66% as opposed to a rather paltry a 51.9% plurality.

The issue that was the subject of the referendum was whether the state of Western Australia (with a land area of just over 1 million square miles or just over a third of the territory of Australia) should secede from the federation and become a separate nation.  The reason why that question came before the British Parliament is that the Australian constitution was a British statute that made no provision for secession.  The only way that the result of the referendum could be implemented was by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament.  Parliament set up the select committee to consider arguments from both the state and federal governments.  The history of those events is discussed by Mr Tom Musgrave of the University of Wollongong in an excellent article entitled The Western Australian  Secessionist Movement which was published at page 95 of the Macquarie Law Journal (2003) Vol 3. Copies of Mr Musgrave's article may be downloaded from the Macquarie Law Journal website.

The parallels between the Western Australian secession referendum and the UK's Brexit referendum are striking.  Identity and sovereignty were important issues in both referendums.  Western Australia had enjoyed considerable autonomy under the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865  (c. 63 28_and_29_Vict) and many of its inhabitants were reluctant to give up that autonomy to join states many hundreds of miles to the east in a continent-wide federation. Similarly, a large section of the British public had always been opposed to an ever closer union.  For a while, participation in the Australian federation brought many economic benefits just as British membership of the European Union did in the United Kingdom.  Those benefits came to an end for many in Western Australia with the Great Depression just as they did for many in the UK with the 2008 recession. A single-issue political movement known as the Dominion League campaigned for a secession referendum just as UKIP did in the UK.  In Western Australia as in the UK, much of the press was vociferous in its support for those referendums and the outcomes of those who campaigned for them.

In my earlier article, I noted that the arguments for and against independence were almost exactly the same as in the Brexit debate.  Essentially whether the will of the overwhelming majority of the Western Australian electorate trumped parliamentary sovereignty as expounded by Burke and Dicey.  In 1935 the doctrines of Burke and Dicey won and it was probably just as well that they did because Austraila found itself at war with Japan in 1941.  Enemy forces bombarded Darwin in February 1942 and were on the point of launching an invasion.  Happily, Australian forces supported by their American and other allies gallantly resisted that challenge but that may not have happened had Australia fragmented into separate nations.  The population of Western Australia was under a million in the early 1940s. There might well have been antagonism between the successor states which would have obstructed a military alliance.  Had Australia or just Western Australia fallen to the enemy the course of the Second World War might have been very different.

Returning to the present, neither Mrs May nor anyone else has explained persuasively why Parliament should not exercise its independent judgment on whether Brexit is or is not a good thing rather than give effect to the will of a narrow plurality.  Losing faith in democracy is one argument and even civil disorder along the lines of the vestes jaunes protest in France has been forecast.  Exactly the same was said in 1935 but nothing like that happened in the end.  Economic conditions improved and calls for independence abated.

There is no reason to suppose the same would not happen if Parliament called a second referendum or simply repeated the European Referendum Act 2015.  As this is a legal blog and not a political one I do not argue that Parliament should do either of those things.  At the same time, nothing has happened since 1935 that leads me to doubt that, if Parliament wished to do so, it could.

Anyone wishing to discuss this or my previous article is welcome to call me on 020 7404 5252 or send me a message through my contact page.

The Western Australian Secession Referendum - A Precedent for Dealing with Troublesome Referendums?

A Crocodile in Lake Argyle, Western Australia

Author: Guyskillen
Licence: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International
Source: Wikipedia, Western Australia

Jane Lambert

On 30 Dec 1932 the Parliament of Western Australia passed the Secession Referendum Act 1932 (23 Geo V No XLVII).  S.5 (1) of the Act required the Governor of Western Australia to issue a writ for a vote by ballot on the following question:

"Are you in favour of the State of Western Australia withdrawing from the Federal Commonwealth established under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Imperial)?"

The Governor carried out his duty and a referendum was held on 8 April 1933.

Voting in that referendum was compulsory.  S.5 (2) declared:

"It shall be the duty of every elector to record his vote at the taking of the said ballot."

Failure to do so was an offence under s.5 (3) and anybody convicted of such offence was liable to a £2 fine under s.5 (4).  Consequently, 91% of the electorate turned out to vote.  Of the 209,359 who voted, 138,653 favoured secession and 70,706 voted against.  Following this plebiscite, the state legislature passed The Secession Act 1934 (25 Geo V No 1) which appointed a delegation to present the case for secession to the United Kingdom Parliament.

The reason why the delegation needed to petition the British Parliament is that the Australian constitution was a British statue that provided for an indissoluble union of the Australian states.  The Parliament of the United Kingdom was the only legislature that could amend the Australian constitution and thus grant independence to a state that wished to secede from the Australian federation.

Upon receiving the petition, Parliament appointed a select committee to consider it.  The committee consisted of 3 peers (including Lord Wright the law lord) and 3 MPs.  They met on 27 March 1935 to hear argument from the state delegation and the Australian federal government.  The state relied on the overwhelming majority in favour of secession arguing that Parliament had a duty to accede to the voters' demand.  The federal government relied on s.4 of the Statute of Westminster 1931 which provided:

"No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof."

Both sides relied on the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty as expounded by Dicey whereby Parliament reserves "the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislature of Parliament."  The secessionists argued that it enabled Parliament to override the Statute of Westminister and the federalists that it transcended any mandate founded on the results of a plebiscite.

In a brief report, the select committee rejected the secessionist case.  It concluded that although Parliament retained the right in law to legislate on any matter in any part of the King's dominions it was bound by convention not to interfere in the affairs of a country that had achieved independence without the consent of the legislature of that country.  As the consent of the Australian federal legislature was not forthcoming, the United Kingdom Parliament could not give effect to the results of the plebiscite.

As might be expected, the decision of the select committee was met with great disappointment in Western Australia.   As in the debate over the desirability of a second referendum on Brexit, there were complaints of an affront to democracy and threats of civil unrest but nothing came of them.  The Labor Party that had campaigned against secession was returned to office. The social and economic conditions that had fuelled calls for recession improved.

In the debate over whether Parliament should respect the results of the 1933 referendum, exactly the same arguments were made then as are being made now.   The idea that Parliament somehow has a duty to effect the will of the people as expressed in a referendum was rejected in terms and rightly so,  A referendum is, after all, nothing more than a creature of statute.  As no parliament may bind its successor it should be possible for Parliament to repeal a statute that provides for a referendum as easily as it can repeal any other legislation.  I can think of nothing that has happened since 1935 to have ousted or limited the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

Anyone wishing to discuss this article should call 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union

Court of Justice of the European Union

Author Cédric Puisney 

Licence Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic

Case C‑621/18,  Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union  [2018] EUECJ C-621/18, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, EU:C:2018:999

Jane Lambert

On 19 Dec 2017. Andy Wightmqn MSP and a number of other Scottish, Westminster and European parliamentarians applied to the  Outer House of the Court of Session for permission to seek a judicial review of the Advocate General for Scotland's refusal to confirm that the Prime Minister's notice of intention to withdraw from the European Union dated 29 March 2017 could be withdrawn unilaterally. The petition came on before Lord Doherty who refused permission for a full hearing on the ground that the application had no real prospect of success (see Re Wightman and Others' application for Judicial review on the issue of the unilateral revocability of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union [2018] ScotCS CSOH_8).

The parliamentarians appealed to the Inner House of the Court of Session which allowed the appeal (see Wightman and Others v Advocate General [2018] CSIH 18).  Delivering judgment on behalf of the Court, Lord Carloway, the Lord President, said at paragraph [30]:

"The issue of whether it is legally possible to revoke the notice of withdrawal is, as already stated, one of great importance. On one view, authoritative guidance on whether it is legally possible to do so may have the capacity to influence Members of Parliament in deciding what steps to take in advance of, and at the time of, a debate and vote on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. After all, if Parliament is to be regarded as sovereign, the Government’s position on the legality of revoking the notice may not be decisive. Whether such guidance falls within the proper scope of judicial review raises yet another issue. However, that scope is wide and, returning to the cautionary words in EY (supra), the law is always developing and, in certain areas, it can do so quickly and dramatically. The scope of judicial review of Government policy may be one such area, at least where no issue of questioning what is said in Parliament arises."

Their Lordships concluded at [32] that "having regard to all the circumstances, the court is of the view that the Lord Ordinary erred in holding that there is no 'real prospect of success' in this petition, as that phrase has been explained above."

Following their successful appeal, the parliamentarians applied for the following relief:

"a. A preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); and for that reference to be sought by way of expedited procedure;
b. On return of that reference from the CJEU, and in the light of the guidance given by that court, for a declarator from this court specifying whether, when and how the notification which was made by letter dated 29 March 2017 from the United Kingdom Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Theresa May MP, to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk under article 50(2) TEU can unilaterally be revoked by the United Kingdom."

Their application was heard by Lord Boyd of Duncansby in Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union  [2018] ScotCS CSOH_61. The learned judge dismissed the application on the grounds that the question was hypothetical.

The parliamentarians appealed again to the Inner House which once again allowed their appeal (see Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2018] ScotCS CSIH_62).  Their Lordships referred the following question to the Court of Justice of the European Union under art 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

“Where, in accordance with Article 50 of the TEU, a Member State has notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, does EU law permit that notice to be revoked unilaterally by the notifying Member State; and, if so, subject to what conditions and with what effect relative to the Member State remaining within the EU”.

In view of the expected Parliamentary proceedings including a "meaningful vote" on any withdrawal agreement that might be negotiated, the Court of Session invited the CJEU to expedite the proceedings before it pursuant to art 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

The Department for Exiting the European Union applied unsuccessfully to the Inner House for permission to appeal against the reference to the Supreme Court.  When its application to the Inner House failed on 8 Nov 2018 the Department applied for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.  The application was heard by Lady Hale, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge on 20 Nov 2018 and was dismissed with costs (see the Supreme Court's order in Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 20 Nov 2018).

The Court of Justice granted the parliamentarians' request for expedition on 19 Oct 2018 in C‑621/18, Wightman and Others v Secretary for State for Exiting the European Union EU:C:2018:851, ECLI:EU:C:2018:851, [2018] EUECJ C-621/18_CO.  The parliamentarians were opposed not only by Her Majesty's government but also by the Commission and the Council.  HMG argued that the question was inadmissible because it was hypothetical as the government had no intention of revoking its notice. The Commission argued that it was hypothetical for another reason, namely that it would have no binding effect on the parties to the main litigation. On the substantive issue, the Commission and Council argued that the right to revoke notice under art 50 could not be unilateral lest it be used to leverage concessions from the other member states.  In their submission, notice could be withdrawn only with the unanimous consent of the remaining member states.

In his opinion of 4 Dec 2018, Mr Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona. Advocate General advised at paragraph [34]:

"According to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling. It follows that questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance."

The CJEU has a right to refuse to hear a case in certain circumstances but, in the Advocate General's view, none of those circumstances applied.  After analysing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 50 of the Treaty of European Union and British legislation he proposed that the Court of Justice should answer the Inner House's question as follows:

"When a Member State has notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union allows the unilateral revocation of that notification, until such time as the withdrawal agreement is formally concluded, provided that the revocation has been decided upon in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements, is formally notified to the European Council and does not involve an abusive practice."

In its judgment yesterday, the full Court agreed with the Advocate General on admissibility:

"It is not for the Court to call into question the referring court’s assessment of the admissibility of the action in the main proceedings, which falls, in the context of the preliminary ruling proceedings, within the jurisdiction of the national court; nor is it for the Court to determine whether the order for reference was made in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organisation of the courts and legal proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 26, and of 7 February 2018, American Express, C‑304/16, EU:C:2018:66, paragraph 34). In the present case, the referring court rejected the pleas of inadmissibility raised before it by the United Kingdom Government concerning the hypothetical or academic nature of the action in the main proceedings. It follows that, in so far as the arguments of the United Kingdom Government and of the Commission are intended to call into question the admissibility of that action, they are irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether the request for a preliminary ruling is admissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2007, Unibet, C‑432/05, EU:C:2007:163, paragraph 33)."

It also followed his reasoning on the substantive law: "as the Advocate General pointed out in points 99 to 102 of his Opinion, it follows from the wording of Article 50(2) TEU that a Member State which decides to withdraw is to notify the European Council of its ‘intention’. An intention is, by its nature, neither definitive nor irrevocable."  In its ruling it actually went firther than the Advocate General:

"Article 50 TEU must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has notified the European Council, in accordance with that article, of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, that article allows that Member State — for as long as a withdrawal agreement concluded between that Member State and the European Union has not entered into force or, if no such agreement has been concluded, for as long as the two-year period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU, possibly extended in accordance with that paragraph, has not expired — to revoke that notification unilaterally, in an unequivocal and unconditional manner, by a notice addressed to the European Council in writing, after the Member State concerned has taken the revocation decision in accordance with its constitutional requirements. The purpose of that revocation is to confirm the EU membership of the Member State concerned under terms that are unchanged as regards its status as a Member State, and that revocation brings the withdrawal procedure to an end."

The significant part of that ruling lies in the last sentence that a revocation of notice under art 50 will leave unchanged the United Kingdon's status in the European Union,   In other words, it can remain out of the euro, out of Schengen if it revoked its notice before 29 March 2019.  After that date, art 49 would apply and the terms of our reentry are unlikely to be anything like as generous as the terms of our present membership.

The timing of the judgment has been criticized by some as an interference in our affairs.  It is nothing of the sort.  It delivered an expedited judgment at the specific request of Scotland's highest court which request was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.   Some may see it as inconvenient but it may also provide us with a way out of our constitutional crisis.

Anyone wishing to discuss this article can call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Writing the EU out of our Copyright Law: The Draft Intellectual Property (Copyright and Related Rights) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations

Jane Lambert

In Copyright and Related Rights after Brexit 19 Oct 2018, I discussed some of the changes to our copyright law and related rights as a result of our departure from the European Union. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has prepared in draft The Intellectual Property (Copyright and Related Rights) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 to provide for some of those changes and the Intellectual Property Office an Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Regulations.

The draft Regulations are divided into five Parts:

• Part 1 (Reg 1) provides the name by which the Regulations may be cited and that they will come into effect on "exit day";
• Part 2 (Regs 2 - 25) makes changes to the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 most of which consist of substituting "the United Kingdom" for references to EEA states;
• Part 3 amends subordinate legislation as follows: 
• Reg 26 makes amendments to The Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995;
• Reg 27 to The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996;
• Reg 28 to The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997;
• Reg 29 to The Artist’s Resale Right Regulations 2006;
• Reg 30 to the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) Regulations 2014;
• Reg 31 to the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) Regulations 2014;
• Reg 32 to The Collective Management of Copyright (EU Directive) Regulations 2016;
• Reg 33 to the Copyright and Performances (Application to Other Countries) Order 2016; and
• Reg 35 to the Copyright and Related Rights (Marrakesh Treaty etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2018; while
• Reg 34 revokes. The Portability of Online Content Services Regulations 2018.
• Part 4  makes changes to EU regulations that are incorporated into the laws of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland by s.3 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018:
• Reg 36 amends Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1563 on the cross-border exchange between the Union and third countries of accessible format copies of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print disabled; and
• Reg 37 revokes Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1563 on the cross-border exchange between the Union and third countries of accessible format copies of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print disabled; and 
• Part 5 (Reg 38) provides that amendments made by the draft Regulations do not apply to any database in which a database right exists under the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 prior to exit day.

The power under which these draft Regulations would be made is s.8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.

The IPO has stated in paragraph 9 of its Explanatory Memorandum that it will incorporate them into its unofficial consolidation of Parts 1 and II of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 as soon as possible after they come into effect.

Anybody wishing to discuss this article or the consequences of Brexit for intellectual property owners may call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Brexit Briefing - November 2018

Author O Flammger
Source Wikipedia Palace of Westminster

Jane Lambert

Negotiators from the United Kingdom and the European Union have agreed the text of a withdrawal agreement in accordance with art 50 (2) of the Treaty on European Union and a political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK. That agreement has been approved by the governments of the member states at a special meeting of the European Council on 25 Nov 2018.

The draft withdrawal agreement provides for an implementation or transition period starting on 29 March 2019 and continuing until at least 31 Dec 2020 during which time the British government will try to negotiate a long-term agreement with the European Union on the lines of the political declaration. During that period, EU law will continue to apply to the UK although it will cease to be a member on 29 March 2019 and will have no representation in the Council or in any of the EU institutions after that date.

The draft agreement will avoid disruption of trade but it will leave the UK as a rule-taker rather a rule-maker during the implementation period. More importantly, it may require the UK to remain in regulatory alignment with the EU even after the end of that period until both sides agree otherwise to ensure an open border with the Republic of Ireland.

This draft is being debated by both Houses of Parliament as I write this briefing and it has already prompted several ministerial resignations.  It is opposed by almost all the opposition parties and by many Conservative MPs on both sides of the Brexit debate.  Though nothing is impossible in present circumstances, most commentators think it unlikely that it will be approved by either House.

The Prime Minister has warned that the alternatives to the draft agreement are an exit from the EU without any implementation period which could be very disruptive to business and the general public or maybe no Brexit at all. In that regard, the Court of Justice of the European Union is hearing a case that has been referred to it by the Court of Session under art 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,  The case has been brought by Andy Wightman and others against the Secretary State for Exiting the European Union on whether the British government can unilaterally withdraw its notice of intention to leave the EU. The Advocate-General has opined that it can on certain specified conditions (see Case 621/18 Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union EU:C:2018:978, ECLI:EU:C:2018:978, [2018] EUECJ C-621/18_O). The full Court is expected to deliver its decision on Monday 10 Dec 2018.

Whether we leave the EU with an agreement or not, it is clear that Community designs and plant varieties and EU trade marks will be converted into British ones, that we shall have a British system of geographical indications very much like the EU system and a supplemental unregistered design right that will be similar to unregistered Community designs,  Of course, none of that will be necessary if we remain in the EU. If we stay in the EU or even exit on the terms of the draft withdrawal agreement there is an outside chance that the Unified Patent Court and unitary patent will come into being and that we will participate in them.  It is highly unlikely that will happen if we leave without agreement.

The British government ratified the United Patent Cout agreement on 26 April 2018 and the Minister with responsibility for Intellectual Property who deposited the instrument of ratification was Sam Gyimh MP. Mr Gyimak is one of the ministers who was felt obliged to resign over the terms of the draft agreement as did his predecessor in the role Mr Jo Johnson MP.  Both were good ministers and it is sad to see them go.

Even though there are just a few weeks to go before the 29 March 2019 the best advice I can offer my clients is prepare for the worse and hope for the best.  Anyone wishing to discuss this article or Brexit generally should call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact page,  I wish all my readers a Merry Christmas and a happy New Year.