Wednesday, 28 October 2020

An Introduction to and Overview of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan

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On 23 Oct 2020, the Secretary of State for International Trade signed an Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Japan for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Tokyo.  The body of the agreement is 406 pages long divided into 24 chapters together with 3 volumes of annexes which can be accessed from UK/Japan: Agreement for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership [CS Japan No.1/2020].

The structure of that agreement is very similar to the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement:

EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

Chapter 1    General provisions

Chapter 1   General provisions

Chapter 2    Trade in goods

Chapter 2 Trade In goods 

Chapter 3    Rules of origin and origin procedures

Chapter 3 Rules of origin and origin procedures 

Chapter 4    Customs matters and trade facilitation

Chapter 4 Customs matters and trade facilitation

Chapter 5    Trade remedies

Chapter 5 Trade remedies

Chapter 6    Sanitary and phytosanitary measures

Chapter 6 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures

Chapter 7    Technical barriers to trade

Chapter 7 Technical barriers to trade

Chapter 8    Trade in services, investment liberalisation and electronic commerce

Chapter 8 Trade in services, investment liberalisation and electronic commerce 

Chapter 9    Capital movements, payments and transfers and temporary safeguard measures

Chapter 9 Capital movements, payments and transfers and temporary safeguard measures 

Chapter 10  Government procurement

Chapter 10 Government procurement

Chapter 11  Competition policy

Chapter 11 Competition policy

Chapter 12  Subsidies

Chapter 12 Subsidies

Chapter 13  State-owned enterprises, enterprises granted special rights or privileges and designated monopolies

Chapter 13 State-owned enterprises, enterprises granted special rights or privileges and designated monopolies 

Chapter 14  Intellectual property

Chapter 14 Intellectual property

Chapter 15  Corporate governance

Chapter 15 Corporate governance 

Chapter 16  Trade and sustainable development

Chapter 16 Trade and sustainable development

Chapter 17  Transparency

Chapter 17 Transparency

Chapter 18  Good regulatory practices and regulatory cooperation

Chapter 18 Good regulatory practices and regulatory cooperation 

Chapter 19  Cooperation in the field of agriculture

Chapter 19 Cooperation in the field of agriculture

Chapter 20  Small and medium-sized enterprises

Chapter 20 Small and medium-sized enterprises

Chapter 21  Dispute settlement

Chapter 21 Trade and women's economic empowerment 

Chapter 22  Institutional provisions

Chapter 22 Dispute settlement

Chapter 23  Final provisions

Chapter 23 Institutional provisions 


Chapter 24 Final provisions


The only difference in structure appears to be the insertion of a chapter on  "Trade and women's economic empowerment" in the UK's agreement with Japan.  The only chapters of either agreement that I have read in full are Chapters 14 of the EU and British agreements which cover intellectual property.  I shall write a separate article on the IP provisions of the UK-Japan agreement shortly.   

According to the British government, the UK-Japan agreement is not an exact copy of the EU-Japan agreement,  There are said to be some provisions in the UK-Japan agreement that have been tailored to British needs.  These may have been identified in the Final Impact Assessment of the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland and Japan for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership and The UK–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Benefits for the UK.   For an independent view of the agreement from an international trade policy consultant and fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatorysee Minako Morita-Jaeger  UK-Japan trade deal will provide political cover - but only a limited trade boost of 27 Oct 2020 on the politics.co.uk website.

Anyone wishing to discuss this article or any of its contents should call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Thursday, 1 October 2020

Brexit Briefing September 2020

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The event for which September 2020 will be remembered was the introduction of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill    Why the Bill was needed at all or at any rate while negotiations on the new partnership with the European Union are at a critical stage is far from obvious.  As I said in The United Kingdom Internal Market Bill  19 Sept 2020 "my first impression on reading through this bill was that there was nothing in it that did not already fall within the scope of existing legislation except perhaps Part 5."

As even Nigel Farage could see, a stiff response from the European Commission was to be expected and perhaps even justified:

If the UK is to leave the customs union and single market and the Republic of Ireland is not, there have to be customs controls at the border between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland unless it is placed somewhere else. The only other place they could be located is between the ports of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  That is what Mrs May said no British Prime Minister could ever do.

It seems unlikely that this difficulty was not foreseen by Mr Johnspn or members of his party when they voted for the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 which ratified the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nothern Ireland from the EuropeanUnion and the European AtomicEnergy Community.  The only explanation that occurs to me is that the Messrs. Johnson, Gove and Lord Frost hoped to renegotiate the withdrawal agreement in the new partnership talks.

Since art 50 (2) of the Treaty on European Union required the negotiators to take account of the framework for the UK's future relationship with the EU which was supposed to be expressed in the Political Declaration, the EU negotiators were mandated only to flesh out the details of that framework.  That is the substance of their draft treaty of 18 March 2020.  When Johnson, Gove, Frost and company refused to consider that draft the talks became deadlocked allegedly on state aids, fishing and dispute settlement.

If that surmise is right the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill could have been intended to jolt the EU into making concessions.  The threat is that if nothing is done the Irish government will be forced to police the border with Northern Ireland that could lead to political instability in the Republic as well as (possibly but from the Briitish point of view much more affordably) in Northern Ireland.   If that is the tactic it is not clear that it will work for the Commission announced at 10:00 this morning the first step in taking legal action against the UK.  We should know fairly quickly for both sides agree that the middle of October is the cut-off point for ratification of any new partnership agreement by the parties' legislatures before the end of the year,

Other developments in September have been the Agreement in Principle on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Japan 12 Sept 2020, exploratory talks with the governments of the parties to the Comprehensive and Progress Agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and continuing talks with the US government on a possible trade deal.

Anyone wishing to discuss this article or any of the issues discussed should call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

UK Joins the CPTPP

Author L.Tak   Licence CC BY-SA 4.0   Source   Wikimedia Commons   Jane Lambert On Sunday 15 Dec 2024, the United Kingdom became the 12th m...