Showing posts with label withdrawal agreement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label withdrawal agreement. Show all posts

Monday, 30 December 2024

British Courts' Jurisdiction in Actions Concerning EU Trade Marks

Jane Lambert

 







An issue in SkyKick UK Ltd and another v Sky Ltd and others (Rev1) [2024] UKSC 36 (13 Nov 2024) was whether the  UK courts retained their jurisdiction to determine pending proceedings involving EU trade marks after 31 Dec 2020 when EU law ceased to apply to the UK.  I mentioned the issue in The Supreme Court's Judgment in SkyKick v Sky in NIPC Law on 19 Jan 2924 but did not discuss it in detail because it was secondary to whether a registration could be invalidated on the ground that the application to register the mark had been made in bad faith because the applicant did not have a genuine intention to use the mark in relation to some or all of the specified goods or services.  I am returning to the jurisdiction issue here because Lord Kitchin devoted 91 paragraphs of his judgment and an appendix to the topic and Lord Reed, the President of the Supreme Court, added a further 38. 

European Union Trade Mark Courts

Art 123 (1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (codification) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 154, 16.6.2017, p. 1–99 ("the EU Trade Mark Regulation") required EU member states to designate in their territories as limited a number as possible of national courts and tribunals of first and second instance to perform the functions assigned to them by that Regulation.  Pursuant to reg 9 of the Community Trade Mark Regulations 1996 (SI 1996 No 1908) as amended by reg 3 of The Community Trade Mark (Designation of Community Trade Mark Courts) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005 No 440) the High Court and Court of Appeal were designated Community trade mark courts and later renamed EU trade mark courts in the UK. Art 124 of the EU Trade Mark Regulation conferred exclusive jurisdiction on those courts for infringement and declarations of non-infringement claims and counterclaims for revocation and declarations of invalidity. 

Art 50 of the Treaty of European Union

Art 50 (2) of the Treaty on European Union required the EU to negotiate and conclude an agreement with a member state that had notified its intention of withdrawing setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal.  Art 50 (3) of the Treaty further provided that the Treaties would cease to apply to the state in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification, unless the European Council, in agreement with the member state concerned, unanimously decided to extend that period.

The Withdrawal Agreement

An Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community was concluded by the European Union and the British government.   Art 126 of the Agreement provided for a transition or implementation period, that started on 31 Jan 2020 and ended on 31 Dec 2020.  During that transition period EU law continued to apply to the UK pursuant to art 127 (1)

The Procedural History

As I noted in The Supreme Court's Judgment in SkyKick v Sky  Sky Ltd., Sky International AG and Sky UK Ltd ("the Sky companies") issued proceedings against SkyKick UK Ltd and SkyKick Inc ("the SkyKick companies") for trade mark infringement and passing off before the 2016 referendum.  The trial before Mr Justice Arnold and the reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union took place while the UK was still a member of the EU.  The further proceedings before Lord Justice Arnold took place during the transition or implementation period.  However, the appeal to the Court of Appeal took place after the end of that period.   Even though they had gained ground in the Court of Appeal where the same or similar issues would have arisen, the Sky companies contended that the Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction to deal with EU trade marks after the end of the implementation period.

The EasyGroup Actions

The issue had been considered by the Chancellor, Sir Julian Flaux, in EasyGroup Ltd v Beauty Perfectionists Ltd [2021] EWHC 3385 (Ch); [2022] Bus LR 146; [2022] FSR 8 and by Mrs Justice Bacon in EasyGroup Ltd v Nuclei Ltd [2022] EWHC 901 (Ch); [2022] FSR 23.  In the first of those actions, the defendants applied to strike out those parts of the claimant's claims that sought an injunction and other remedies outside the United Kingdom, on the basis that even though the present proceedings were pending as of 31 Dec 2020 (the date when the UK left the European Union) the High Court no longer had jurisdiction to grant a pan-EU injunction or other remedies in respect of alleged infringement of EUTMs. The Chancellor concluded that he retained jurisdiction to grant pan-European injunctions and dismissed the application.   In para [91] of her judgment in the second action, the parties agreed that Mrs Justice Bacon should proceed on the basis that the court retained the same jurisdiction to deal with both infringement and validity of the EU marks as it had before 31 Dec 2020.  They reached that decision after considering the Chancellor's judgment.  The Sky companies argued that those cases were wrongly decided.

Sky's Contentions

Lord Kitchin noted in para [454] of his judgment that the Sky companies had submitted that, at the end of the transition period all EU trade mark rights in and relating to the UK were extinguished.  Jurisdiction over infringement and validity of EU trade marks now lay exclusively with EU trade mark courts in the remaining EU member states.  Neither the UK nor the EU had legislated for any EU court or tribunal to exercise any jurisdiction over or relating to any comparable UK trade mark that had been issued to EU trade mark owners after their EU trade marks ceased to apply to the UK, or for any court in the UK to exercise any jurisdiction over, or relating to, any EU trade mark in the territories of the remaining member states. Secondly, the Sky companies contended that as of 31 Dec 2020, no courts in the UK were in fact designated as EU trade mark courts to resolve the limited number of cases which were pending before those courts on that day.  Thirdly, the Sky companies submitted that reg 6 and Sched 5 to the Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019 No 269) effectively repealed the legislation designating UK courts as EU Trade Mark Courts.

Judgment

Lord Kitchin rejected the Sky companies' submissions on the grounds that they did not take account of the provisions of the withdrawal agreement.   Art 67 (1) provides:
"In the United Kingdom, as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom, in respect of legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period and in respect of proceedings or actions that are related to such legal proceedings pursuant to Articles 29, 30 and 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 or Articles 12 and 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009, the following acts or provisions shall apply:
.........
(b)   the provisions regarding jurisdiction of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001......"

Lord Kitchin interpreted those words as follows in para [436]: 

"(a) the provisions of the EUTM Regulation "regarding jurisdiction"
(b) 'shall apply'
(c) 'in the United Kingdom, as well as in Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom,
(d) 'in respect of legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period'."

This was consistent with the guidance of both the EU and UK Intellectual Property Offices which he referred to between paras [441] and [448]. 

Lord Reed reached the same conclusion as Lord Kitchin for much the same reasons.

Further Information

Anyone wishing to discuss this article may call me on 020 7404 5252 during normal office hours or message me through my contact form at other times.

Tuesday, 10 May 2022

Art 67 of the Withdrawal Agreement and Art 132 of the EUTMR - Crafts Group LLC v M/S Indeutsch International

Author Sadarama Licence CC BY-SA 4.0 Source Wikimedia Commons



















Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (Mr Ian Karet) Crafts Group LLC v M/S Indeutsch International and another [2021] EWHC 3505 (IPEC) (23 Dec 2021)

This was an application by the defendants, M/S Indeutsch International and M/S KnitPro International ("KnitPro"), for the following relief:
  • an order to set aside service in India of proceedings brought by the claimant, Crafts Group LLC ("Crafts") for groundless threats under s.21 of the Trade Marks Act 1994, 
  • a declaration that the court has no jurisdiction over the KnitPro; or 
  • alternatively, for a stay of proceedings pending determination of the validity of one of the trade marks in dispute by the European Union Intellectual Property Office ("EUIPO").
The threats of which the Crafts complained were two takedown notices that had been sent by the defendants' solicitors.to Amazon.  They concerned two of Crafts knitting needles.   The claimant alleged that Amazon would not relist its knitting needles unless the notices were withdrawn or there was an intervention by the court.  Permission to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction had been granted by HH Judge Hacon.   The invalidity proceedings in the EUIPO had been. started by the claimant's predecessor, Crafts American Group.  

KnitPro complained that service of the threats action had been defective because the application notice and evidence in support of the application for permission to serve process overseas had not been served on them.  Secondly, KnotPro said that Crafts had failed to make full and frank disclosure at the hearing of its application which was made without notice and in KnitPro's absence.  Alternatively, KnitPro argued that the invalidity proceedings should be allowed to take their course.

The application came on before Mr Ian Karet sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court on 23 Nov 2021. The learned deputy delivered judgment on 23 Dec 2021 (see Crafts Group LLC v M/S Indeutsch International and another  [2021] EWHC 3505 (IPEC) (23 Dec 2021).

Mr Karet considered first the application to set arise service of the threats action proceedings.  He directed himself that CPR 6.36 enables the court to permit service out of the jurisdiction if any of the grounds set out in para 3.1 of PD 6B applies. CPR 6.37 requires an application to set out the relevant ground(s) for service out of the jurisdiction. The court will give permission only if it is satisfied that England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim.. CPR 6.38 provides for service of any document other than a claim form.   Applications for permission to serve process outside the jurisdiction are made under CPR Part 23.  CPR23.10 entitles a person who was not served with a copy of the application notice for a without notice order to apply to have the order set aside or varied.

The deputy judge declined to set aside service for failure to serve the application notice and supporting evidence,  He referred to CPR 3.10 which provides:
"Where there has been an error of procedure such as a failure to comply with a rule or practice direction—
(a) the error does not invalidate any step taken in the proceedings unless the court so orders; and
(b) the court may make an order to remedy the error." 
He also considered the Court of Appeal's judgment in  Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 and the commentary on that case in the White Book at paras 3.9.3, 3.9.4 and 3.9.7, In his view, KnitPro had not been significantly disadvantaged by the belated provision of the application notice and evidence given to the court on the application for service out. The making of the service out order was not conditional upon the service of those documents. Failure to serve those documents does not render the service ineffective. The error could be remedied by an order under CPR 3.10.   He reached the same conclusion by considering Denton by analogy even though that case was not directly applicable.

Turning to the alleged failure to give full and frank disclosure, Mr Karet listed the alleged deficiencies as follows:
"i) The evidence did not fairly present to the court the fact that there was no correspondence between the parties in relation to alleged unjustified threats from July 2015, when the first takedown notice was submitted to Amazon UK, to November 2020.
ii) Crafts did not show the court that there had been a second takedown request submitted to Amazon in November 2015, as to which Crafts did and said nothing.
iii) On the basis of these facts, there would at least be open to KnitPro an argument that Crafts had impliedly consented to, or acquiesced to, its takedown requests. The court was not told that.
iv) Crafts appeared to tell the court in general terms the subject-matter of without prejudice discussions between the parties. But the information Crafts gave was wrong. KnitPro's position was that there was no such discussion about any alleged threats action at all.
v) Crafts' evidence in support wrongly suggested that the threats of infringement proceedings were ongoing. Crafts incorrectly elided present threats with ongoing damage from earlier threats.
vi) Crafts did not inform the court that the absence of infringement proceedings in the UK could not simply be taken to indicate that the Caspian and Sunstruck needles did not in fact infringe the Chevron and Symfonie Marks, as Crafts asserted.
vii) Crafts' account of the EU invalidity proceedings was incomplete and imprecise."

 The learned deputy declined to set aside service on the ground of material non-disclosure.  In his view, the correct test for full and frank disclosure on an application for service outside the jurisdiction is that set out by Mr Justice Toulson between paras [23] and [31] of his judgment in MRG (Japan) Limited v Engelhard Metals Japan Limited [2003] EWHC 3418 (Comm), [2004] 1 LLR 731, [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 731:

"[23] The starting point is that an applicant for an order on a without notice application must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts, that is, facts known to the applicant which might reasonably be taken into account by the judge in deciding whether to grant the application: R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners ex parte Princess Edmund De Polignac [1917] 1 KB 486, 514 (Scrutton LJ); Siporex Trade SA v Comdel Commodities Limited [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 428, 437 (Bingham J); Brink's Mat Limited v Elcombe [1988] 1 WLR 1350, 1356 (Ralph Gibson LJ).
[24]. It is for the court to determine what is material according to its own judgment and not the assessment of the applicant: Brink's Mat Limited v Elcombe. This means that if the court considers there to have been material non-disclosure, it is not an answer that the applicant in good faith took a different view, although that may affect the court's exercise of its discretion in deciding what to do in the light of the non-disclosure. It does not mean that an applicant is under a duty to disclose facts which could not reasonably have a bearing on the decision which the judge has to make.
[25- Materiality therefore depends in every case on the nature of the application and the matters relevant to be known by the judge when hearing it. I was referred to a number of statements on the duty of disclosure in the context of applications for freezing injunctions. In such cases the court is being asked to make an order of an exceptional kind, prohibiting or restricting a defendant's use of its own assets before any adjudication has been made against it. Because of its draconian nature, it is a jurisdiction which requires great caution and a wide range of factors may have a bearing on the court's decision.
[26]. An application for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction is of a very different nature. The general principles about disclosure on without notice applications still apply, but the context is different. The focus of the inquiry is on whether the court should assume jurisdiction over a dispute. The court needs to be satisfied that there is a dispute properly to be heard (i.e. that there is a serious issue to be tried); that there is a good arguable case that the court has jurisdiction to hear it; and that England is clearly the appropriate forum. Beyond that, the court is not concerned with the merits of the case.
[27]. Authority supports this approach. In BP Exploration Co (Libya) Limited v Hunt [1976] 3 AER 879 (which concerned an application for leave to serve out of the jurisdiction) Kerr J said at 893:
'In my view, a failure to refer to arguments on the merits which the defendant may seek to raise in answer to the plaintiff's claim at the trial should not generally be characterised as a failure to make a full and fair disclosure, unless they are of such weight that their omission may mislead the court in exercising its jurisdiction under the rule and its discretion whether or not to grant leave.'

[29] If MRG was aware of matters which might reasonably have caused the judge to have any doubt whether he should grant permission to serve out of the jurisdiction, those would have been relevant matters and therefore ought to have been disclosed. This must be so in principle, and it is implicit in the authorities to which I have referred.
[30] However, Mr Gruder submitted that the duty of disclosure was wider. He submitted that if an applicant knew matters which would not on any reasonable view make any difference to whether there was a serious issue to be tried, or to any of the other questions which the judge had to consider, but which were relevant to the ultimate merits of the action, they must be disclosed. To the question "why?", Mr Gruder's answer was that: i) it is for the court and not for the applicant to decide what is material and ii) anything which is relevant to the merits of the claim is potentially relevant to the matters which the judge has to consider. I do not accept that submission. The first proposition is correct, but Mr Gruder seeks to apply it in such a way as to enlarge the test of materiality. It is for the court to determine what is material, but the test of materiality is that to which I have referred: whether the matter might reasonably be taken into account by the judge in deciding whether to grant the application. The second proposition goes too far. There may be many points which would be relevant to the ultimate merits of an action, but which could not on any reasonable view affect the judge in deciding the "merits threshold" question (or the ultimate question whether to grant the application).
[31]. Mr Gruder submitted that if the applicant is not required to disclose all matters which go to the merits of the action, but only those matters which go to the questions whether there is a serious issue to be tried, whether the court has jurisdiction to hear it and whether England is clearly the appropriate forum, the result will be to reduce the judge's role on such an application to a "rubber stamping" exercise. I would not agree with that description, although I do agree that the issues which the judge is required to consider are limited. This is because the judge is at this stage concerned with the question whether the court should assume jurisdiction, rather than with the question who is likely to win."

Mr Karet explained at para [41] of his judgment:

"While the evidence in support of service in this case may have mis-described matters, this was by mistake. The complaints KnitPro raise about the evidence do not go to the question of whether this court has jurisdiction over the alleged threats. Instead, they are matters that may be raised in defence to the threats claim. KnitPro are in effect adopting the unsuccessful approach which Toulson J dismissed in MRG of concentrating upon matters that may be relevant to the ultimate merits of the action rather than whether there was a serious issue to be tried. Accordingly I do not think there has been material non-disclosure in this context."

    For good measure, the deputy judge added at [42]:

    "If there had been material non-disclosure then I would also have dismissed the application on the basis that the judge would have given permission had the full facts been before him."

    The last issue before Mr Karet was whether to stay the threats action pending the invalidity application in the EUPO.  The defendants argued that art 67 of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community continued to apply art 132 of the European Union Trade Mark Regulation which provided:

    "An EU trade mark court hearing an action referred to in Article 124 other than an action for a declaration of non-infringement shall, unless there are special grounds for continuing the hearing, of its own motion after hearing the parties or at the request of one of the parties and after hearing the other parties, stay the proceedings where the validity of the EU trade mark is already in issue before another EU trade mark court on account of a counterclaim or where an application for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity has already been filed at the Office."

    The Chancellor had held in Easygroup Limited v Beauty Perfectionists Limited [2021] EWHC 3385 (Ch), [2022] Bus LR 146, [2022] WLR(D) 7 that art 67 of the withdrawal agreement has direct effect as part of domestic law without the need for any further legislative enactment.  Mr Karet also referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Starbucks (HK) Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Group plc [2012] EWCA Civ 1201 that there is a strong presumption in favour of a stay.   The Court added that "special grounds" within the meaning of art 132 are hard to make out and that a general argument about getting to the end of proceedings is unlikely to be sufficient.

    Mr Karet declined to order a stay pending the outcome of the validity proceedings in the EUIPO.   Art 124 listed a number of causes of actions that were reserved for EU trade mark courts but threats actions were not one of them.  

    Anyone wishing to discuss this article can call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

    Thursday, 23 September 2021

    Change of Focus

    Winkel triple projection SW.jpg
    Author Daniel R Strebe 15 Aug 2011 Copyright waived  Source Wikimedia Commons

    Jane Lambert

    During the 2016 referendum campaign, I wrote that the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union would profoundly affect the laws that protect investment in branding, design, technology and creativity (see Were we to go - what would Brexit mean for IP 26 Feb 2016 NIPC Law). I noted that the nature and extent of that change would "depend on the sort of relationship with the rest of the EU that we could negotiate in the two years allowed by art 50 (2) of the Treaty on European Union." After a plurality of voters had voted for withdrawal, I followed those negotiations in this blog in order in order to make an educated guess as to how this country's IP law would develop.

    Although there may still be further negotiations between the UK and the European Commission over the Northern Ireland Protocol for the reasons I discussed in British Proposals for Renegotiating the Northern Ireland Protocol on 29 July 2021, they are unlikely to result in major changes to this country's IP laws.  The legal framework following Brexit is set out in my article How Brexit has changed IP Law of 17 Jan 2021 and presentation of 26 Jan 2021 (slides and notes).

    While bilateral treaties such as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan and the proposed Australia-UK Free Trade Agreement contain provisions on intellectual property, it is unlikely that any of them will require amending legislation. What might are the intellectual property provisions of the Trans Pacific Partnership which are incorporated by reference into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Chapter 20 of the Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement.   I shall therefore focus in future on those developments rather than bad-tempered exchanges arising from the withdrawal and trade and cooperation agreements. 

    HMG has embarked on a great experiment of decoupling from neighbours and allies with shared interests in the world's richest trading bloc and forming new relationships with fast growing economies on the other side of the world.  It is by no means certain that that experiment will succeed and my change of focus should not be seen as an endorsement of the experiment. But it is more relevant to the startups and other SME and their professional advisors that form the bulk of my clientele and require practical advice on IP prosecution, licensing and enforcement in the UK and any new markets that may open up as a result of the government's activities.

    To reflect the change of focus I shall change the name of this publication from "NIPC Brexit" to "NIPC Internatiomal" and replace the monthly "Brexit Briefings" with targeted updates.   Anyone wishing to discuss this article may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during normal business hours or send me a message through my contact form.

    Saturday, 7 August 2021

    Brexit Briefing - July 2021

    Christmas Truce 1914
    Author Harold B Ronson Copyrightexpired Source Wikimedia Commons


















    On the first Christmas of the Great War, the fighting paused to enable both sides to bury their dead.  At least one football match took place between opposing troops. Luxuries from food parcels were exchanged as well as other simple kindnesses.  The suspension by the Commission of legal proceedings against the British government for alleged breaches of the withdrawal agreement is reminiscent of that truce.  There has even been a football match with Germany which England conveniently won.

    The Christmas truce of 1914 did not last long and there is no reason to believe that the slightly improved relationship between the UK and its neighbours will last any longer.  There have certainly been enough provocations from the British media from exaggerated indignation over the announcement of visa waiver fees to visit Schengen countries to David Gauke's article Dominic Cummings’s solution to the Irish border problem would have been disastrous on 29 July 2921 in The New Statesman alleging a plot to drive the Irish Republic out of the European Union or at least out of the single market.  

    From a brexiteer perspective, such a plot is not as mad as it sounds. It would have avoided customs checks in the Irish sea and on the island of Ireland.  It might even have worked.  There has been a lot of ill-feeling between Britain and Ireland over the centuries but the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic share a common travel area, a common language, the common law, a parliamentary system of government, close economic ties and even closer family ones.  Relations between Dublin and Brussels have been strained over Irish tax incentives to attract US tech companies and they may become strained again if the recent consensus on taxation is ever implemented.  It is not entirely fanciful to suppose that a time may come when the peoples of the UK and Ireland may find that they have more in common with each other than they do with the Continent and that they have more to gain from cooperating with each other than with their continental neighbours.

    The suspension of legal proceedings has been viewed by some as a sign of weakness on the part of the EU. It is said that the Commission has been spooked by the threat in Northern Ireland Protocol: the way forward to invoke art 16 of the Northern Irish Protocol. I have to say that I do not think that is very likely. As I explained in British Proposals for Renegotiating the Northern Ireland Protocol on 29 July 2021, art 16 is intended only to bring short term relief should the application of this Protocol lead to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade.  It can be compared to a force majeure clause in a commercial contract.  A more likely explanation for the suspension of legal proceedings is that civil servants on both sides like to take their family holidays in August.

    In his foreword to Global Britain in a competitive age which I discussed in my article of 19 March 2021, the Prime Minister wrote:
    "In 2021 the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of the two largest warships ever built for the Royal Navy, will lead a British and allied task group on the UK’s most ambitious global deployment for two decades, visiting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. She will demonstrate our interoperability with allies and partners – in particular the United States – and our ability to project cutting-edge military power in support of NATO and international maritime security. Her deployment will also help the Government to deepen our diplomatic and prosperity links with allies and partners worldwide."

    That task force has now arrived in the Pacific to the irritation of the Chinese government that was to be expected:

    "The threat to freedom of navigation could only come from the one who deploys a carrier strike group to the South China Sea half a world away and flexes its naval muscles to heighten the military tension in that region." (Chinese embassy in London quoted by Frank Gardner in China warns UK as carrier strike group approaches 30 July 2021 BBC website)

    What was perhaps less expected was its lukewarm reception by the USA.  Katherine Hille reported that US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin had suggested that the UK might be more helpful as an ally if it did not focus on Asia.  In a speech at an event in Singapore sponsored by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Mr Austin stressed that military resources were scarce and that the US and its allies had to work out the best way of sharing military burdens. “If for example, we focus a bit more here [in Asia], are there areas that the UK can be more helpful in other parts of the world?” he mused,  Hille opined that Mr Austin's remarks would come as a blow to HM government (see Katherine Hille Britain ‘more helpful’ closer to home than in Asia, says US defence chief 27 July 2021 Financial Times).

    In addition to the negotiations to accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership which I mentioned in my Brexit Briefing for May 2021, the UK has become a dialogue partner to the Association of South-East Asian States (see the joint press release from the Foreign Office and the Department for International Trade UK becomes Dialogue Partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 5 Aug 2021). The press release does not state what a "dialogue partner" actually does and it appears that the UK enjoyed that status through its membership of the EU until 31 Dec 2020.

    Nevertheless, it is another quiet achievement for the Department for International Trade under Liz Truss, She is the minister who has escaped most of the criticism that has been levelled at the government.  Truss's department seems to be responsible for business with the EU now that the withdrawal and trade and cooperation negotiations are at an end.  It has published useful documents such as its guidance on EU business: data protection and copyright updated 9 July 2021.  Truss campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU in 2016 yet she has become the minister who has come closest to making brexit work. 

    Anyone wishing to discuss this article or any of the topics discussed in it may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through this form at other times.  

    Thursday, 29 July 2021

    British Proposals for Renegotiating the Northern Ireland Protocol

    Author Heenah Licence CC BY-SA 4.0 Source Wikimedia Commons

     











    Jane Lambert

    The pickle in which HM government finds itself over the Northern Ireland Protocol to the agreement between the EU and the UK for the UK's withdrawal from the European Union was hardly unexpected. If there is to be regulatory divergence between the UK and the EU there have to be customs inspections and formalities somewhere.  If the re-establishment of customs posts on the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is unacceptable to this country's European and American allies, then inspections and formalities have to take place between Great Britain and both parts of the island of Ireland.

    Immediately after the end of the implementation or transition period provided by art 126 of the withdrawal agreement, there was disruption in the supply of goods from Britain to Northern Ireland.  These led to street protests and calls for the denunciation of the Protocol if not the whole of the withdrawal agreement.  But there are signs that Northern Ireland retailers are sourcing more and more products from within Northern Ireland, the Republic or the rest of the EU.  That is, of course, weakening economic ties with Great Britain and strengthening ties with the Republic. Ultimately that could lead to the cession of Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic. While Irish unification would be welcomed by some in Great Britain it would be regarded as a calamity not only by Northern Ireland Unionists but also by many members of the British Conservative and Unionist Party.   

    Mrs Theresa May was offered an arrangement similar to the Northern Irish Protocol but she rejected it on the ground that it was something that no British Prime Minister could accept.  That raises the question of why her immediate successor did just that.  Para 13 of the UK Government position paper Northern Ireland Protocol: the way forward (CP 502) published on 21 July 2021 offers the following explanation:

    "However Parliament’s insistence in the BennBurt Act that the UK could not leave the EU without an agreement radically undermined the Government’s negotiating hand; and the final compromise, while delivering the fundamental aim of a clear Brexit, and recognisably based on the UK’s proposal, included several elements which would prove to cause difficulties subsequently: notably, though not only, the EU’s insistence on customs arrangements between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with detail to be worked out subsequently; and the failure to provide for Northern Ireland’s consent to enter the arrangements."

    That does not make a lot of sense.  Had the government's negotiating hand not been "undermined" the government would have been free to take the United Kingdom out of the EU without any agreement on anything including the border between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland.  That would inevitably have led to border controls and probably security forces to protect them.

    The doleful consequences of the Protocol are summarized in para 20 of the position paper:

    "Supply chains have been disrupted and costs increased, with staff redeployed to deal with new bureaucracy, impacting investment and growth. Consumers have seen real impacts: at least 200 companies in Great Britain have stopped servicing the Northern Ireland market; plants and trees long-sourced from Great Britain can no longer be stocked in nurseries or garden centres in Northern Ireland; supermarkets have reduced their product lines due to the delays and barriers in moving goods; and the costs of deliveries for those who do serve the market have continued to increase. The effects are felt more broadly too. Medicines are at risk of discontinuation because the hurdles to clear to reach the small Northern Ireland market make supply unviable. And pet owners, including those reliant on assistance dogs, have faced the prospect of unnecessary vaccinations and treatments, and bureaucratic certification hurdles simply to travel within the United Kingdom."

    If this is true, the Northern Irish Protocol is clearly not working for the benefit of British suppliers to Northern Ireland but that does not mean that consumers in that province are going hungry.  There are signs that supplies from Great Britain are being replaced by supplies from Ireland and other EU member states (see InterTradeIreland Cross-Border Trade & Supply Chain Linkages Report).

    In the position paper, the government is threatening to invoke art 16 of the Protocol.   It is hard to see how that will help.  The first paragraph of the article provides:

    "If the application of this Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade, the Union or the United Kingdom may unilaterally take appropriate safeguard measures. Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Protocol."

    It would appear that "safeguard measures" taken under this article are to be proportionate, short-term and to be taken only in an emergency.  If such measures lead to an imbalance between the rights and obligations under this Protocol, the other party may take such proportionate rebalancing measures as are strictly necessary to remedy the imbalance in accordance with art 16 (2).  Extensive consultations are required before a party may resort to art 16.

    The revision to the Protocol that the British government appears to want is inspection-free entry of goods that are intended for consumption in Northern Ireland and full controls for goods intended for the Republic and beyond.   How this would work is not clear because most exporters to the Republic would be expected to choose the M4 to Fishguard or the A55 to Hollyhead rather than the long drive to Cairnryan. The only advantage of the latter would be the opportunity to smuggle. 

    The other concession that the government seeks is to remove the resolution of disputes from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. As EU law applies to the Protocol it is unlikely that there can be much movement there.

    Anyone wishing to discuss this article may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during normal business hours or send me a message through my contact form.

    Sunday, 25 April 2021

    Has the Volte-Face on the Unified Patent Court Agreement been worth it?

    Author Cédric Pusney Licence CC BY 2.0 Source Wikimedia Commons

     



















    Tomorrow is World Intellectual Property Day,  It is an international festival of creativity and innovation to celebrate the anniversary of the coming into force of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization on 26 April 1970,  Because it is a very significant anniversary, governments like to make momentous announcements about intellectual property on that day

    One such announcement on World Intellectual Property Day was British ratification of the Unified Patent Court Agreement ("UPCA") made exactly 3 years ago by the then Foreign Secretary the Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP.   As British ratification was as welcome as it had been unexpected, I hailed it t as "Possibly the best thing to happen on World Intellectual Property Day", Any euphoria occasioned by that news was very short-lived.   A volte-face came less than 2 years later.  Part of the reason for that reversal. according to a parliamentary written statement by Amanda Solway MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Minister for Science, Research and Innovation, was:
    "Participating in a court that applies EU law and is bound by the CJEU would be inconsistent with the Government’s aims of becoming an independent self-governing nation." (see UK Withdrawal from the UPCA 20 July 2020 Unified Patent Court website).

    In other words, the UPCA was thought to be incompatible with "taking back control" and the notion of sovereignty. 

    Any intervention by the CJEU would have been minimal compared to matters in which Her Majesty's government has agreed to the continued involvement of that Court. First, the agreement by which the UK withdrew from the EU and Euratom provides for disputes over the Northern Ireland Protocol to be resolved by the CJEU as the House of Lords noted in paras 256 to 258 of their  Report on the Protocol.  

    Secondly, s.6 (2) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 permits courts and tribunals in the UK to have regard to judgments of the CJEU delivered after 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020 in so far as they may be relevant to any matter before them.  In Warner Music UK Ltd and another v TuneIn Inc. [2021] EWCA Civ 441 (26 March 2021) the Court of Appeal decided to follow the CJEU's judgment in  C-392/19 VG Bild-Kunst v Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz  [2021] EUECJ C-392/19, [2021] WLR(D) 157, EU:C:2021:181, ECLI:EU:C:2021:181 which was delivered months after the expiry of the implementation period provided by art 126 of the withdrawal agreement. 

    Thirdly, although the case law of the CJEU delivered before 31 Dec 2020 continues to bind British courts and tribunals, the Court of Appeal does have power to depart from that case law on the same basis that the Supreme Court has power to depart from one of its own precedents or of one of the House of Lords in accordance with the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234: In TuneIn, the appellant's primary contention was that the Court of Appeal should depart from the entire body of case law of the CJEU on communication to the public, or alternatively, that the Court should depart from Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV [2016] WLR(D) 477, [2016] EUECJ C-160/15, [2016] Bus LR 1231, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, EU:C:2016:644.

    The Court of Appeal struck down that argument like a whack-a-mole. Lord Justice Arnold gave no less than 8 reasons why departing from the CJEU's case law would be a bad idea between paras [77[ to [88] of his judgment.  The Master of the Rolls offered two, namely that the CJEU's case law was based on international agreements and there was no immediate .need to change anything.  Lady Justice Rose agreed that this was absolutely not a case in which this court should exercise its power to depart from the EU jurisprudence.  For those who are interested in the TuneIn appeal, I wrote a case note on the Court of Appeal's judgment in The Appeal: Warner Music UK Ltd and others v Tuneii Inc in NIPC Law on 24 April 2021.  

    The UPC and the unitary patent would have benefited British industry great which is why they were recommended by both Gowers and Hargreaves.  Because of the adversarial system of civil litigation and the rule that costs of litigation are paid by the losing party the United Kingdom (and in particular) England is the most expensive and riskiest jurisdiction in the world in which to enforce an intellectual property right.  It is no coincidence that the country of Newton and Berners-Lee which initiated the industrial revolution and which still has some of the strongest research universities in the world trails consistently not just Germany and France in the number of European patent applications but also the Netherlands with a third of its population and Switzerland with one eighth.   A heavy price indeed for the chimaera of sovereignty.

    Anyone wishing to discuss this article may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

    Monday, 29 March 2021

    The Commission's Second Letter of Formal Notice

    Author Oliver Dixon  Licence CC BY-SA 2,0 Source Brexit and the Irish Border



    On 3 March 2021, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced that 
    "For supermarkets and their suppliers, as part of the operational plan the UK committed to at the UK-EU Joint Committee on 24 February, the current Scheme for Temporary Agri-food Movements to Northern Ireland (STAMNI) will continue until 1 October. Certification requirements will then be introduced in phases alongside the roll out of the Digital Assistance Scheme." (see the minister's written statement of 3 March 2021). 

    In a letter to Lord Frost dated 15 March 2021, Mr Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the Commission complained that the announcement was a breach of the Northern Ireland Protocol which is an integral part of the agreement by which the UK withdrew from the European Union.

    The letter is the first step in proceedings that the Commission has threatened to bring against the British government for the infringement of the withdrawal agreement.   It indicates that the Commission has two options.  It could bring proceedings in the Court of Justice of the European Union under art 12 (4) of the Northern Ireland Protocol:

    "In particular, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have the jurisdiction provided for in the Treaties in this respect. The second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU shall apply to and in the United Kingdom in this respect."
    Alternatively, it can start consultations under art 169 (1) of the withdrawal agreement:

    "The Union and the United Kingdom shall endeavour to resolve any dispute regarding the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Agreement by entering into consultations in the Joint Committee in good faith, with the aim of reaching a mutually agreed solution. A party wishing to commence consultations shall provide written notice to the Joint Committee."

    This could lead to arbitration in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures that I discussed in Dispute Resolution under the Withdrawal Agreement on 31 Dec 2020.

    Either course could have adverse consequences for the British government. A press release of 15 March 2021 hints darkly at "the possibility to impose a lump sum or penalty payment" if the Commission prevails though it does not identify the authority by which such a penalty could be imposed and I can't think of any right now. However, it could make a finding that would embarrass the British government in its dealings with countries outside the EU.  As for the alternative, the press release warns:

    "This may ultimately also result in the imposition of financial sanctions by the arbitration panel. In case of non-payment or persisting non-compliance, the EU could suspend its obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement (with the exception of the citizens' rights part of the agreement) or from the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in accordance with Article INST.24(4), e.g. by imposing tariffs on imports of goods from the UK."

    That would be damaging especially as the UK and remaining member states remain party to many other multilateral agreements such as the Atlantic alliance.

    Anyone wishing to discuss this article or the resolution of disputes with the EU may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact page.

    Sunday, 17 January 2021

    How Brexit has changed IP Law

     
    EU Intellectual Property Office, Alicante
    Author Kristof Roomp Licence CC BY 2.0














    Jane Lambert

    In Were we to go - what would Brexit mean for IP? (26 Feb 2016 NIPC Law) I first considered the consequences of Britsh withdrawal from the European Union.  It was obvious that EU trade marks, Community designs and Community plant varieties would cease to apply to the UK.  Also, I could not see how the UK could remain a party to the Unified Patent Court Agreement as the agreement was open only to EU member states. I considered the topic further in IP Planning for Brexit on 7 Dec 2016 in Implications of Brexit on Intellectual Property Law: What can be salvaged from the UPC Agreement on 17 Feb 2017 and in my contribution on IP to Helen Wong's Doing Business After BrexitAs the UK has withdrawn from the EU and the transitional period is over, it is now possible to take stock. 

    Art 50 Treaty on European Union ("TEU")

    A timetable for the UK's departure was set by art 50 of the TEU.   Art 50 (2) requires the EU to negotiate and conclude an agreement with that departing state, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the EU.  Art 50 (3) adds:
    "The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period."

    The former Prime Minister, Mrs Theresa May MP, served notification of the UK's intended departure under art 50 (2) on 29 March 2017.  Subject only to the possibility of an agreed extension to the notification period, the British government had to try to negotiate a withdrawal agreement and legislate for the UK's departure before 29 March 2019.

    European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018

    The statute that effected the UK's departure from the EU was the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.  As EU law would cease to apply to the UK from the expiry of the notification period or the entry into force of a withdrawal agreement, s.3 (1) of the Act preserved Council regulations by incorporating them into the laws of the UK.  These included the Council Regulations establishing EU trade marks,  Community designs, Community plant varieties and supplementary protection certificates.   S.8 (1) and Sched. 1 of the Act enabled Ministers to amend such Regulations by statutory instrument.   

    The 2019 Statutory Instruments

    Since it was not certain that a withdrawal agreement could be made and ratified by the 29 March 2019, the following statutory instruments were made in case the UK left the EU without such an agreement:

    The Patents (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019 No 801) were made on 4 April 2019 after an extension had been agreed in accordance with art 50 (3) TEU.   The Agricultural Products, Food and Drink (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019 No 1366) were made on 21 Oct 2019.

    The Withdrawal Agreement

    Following further extensions in accordance with art 50 (3) TEU, the appointment of a new prime minister and more negotiations with the EU  the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community ("the withdrawal agreement") was concluded on 19 Oct 2019.  That agreement was ratified by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 on 23 Jan 2020.

    Title IV of Part Three of the withdrawal agreement included the following provisions on IP:
    • Art 54 provided for continued protection in the UK of intellectual assets that had previously been protected as EU trade marks, registered Community designs, Community plant varieties and geographical indications;
    • Art 55 established a procedure for registering trade marks, designs and plant breeders' rights to protect such assets in the UK;
    • Art 56 provided for continued protection in the UK of international trade marks designating the EU under the Madrid system and international designs designating the EU under the Hague Agreement;
    • Art 57 provided for continued protection in the UK of unregistered Community designs that would have come into being before 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020 for the remainder of their term and the creation of a similar UK intellectual property right to protect such designs that might come into being afterwards;
    • Art 58 required continued protection of databases;
    • Art 59 provided for pending applications for EU trade marks, RCD and Community plant variety rights;
    • Art 60 provided for supplementary protection certificates' and
    • Art 61 for the exhaustion of rights.
    Although the UK left the EU on 31 Jan 2020 pursuant to the withdrawal agreement, art 126 provided for a transition or implementation period until 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020 during which time EU law would continue to apply to the UK.

    The Intellectual Property (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

    Because of the extensions under art 50 (3) and the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement, the 2019 statutory instruments were not required until the end of the transition period.  As they had been drafted before the withdrawal agreement was concluded, they had to be modified to give effect to Title IV of that agreement.  The Intellectual Property (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020 No 1050) amended the 2019 statutory instruments as follows:
    • Part 2 amended the Intellectual Property (Copyright and Related Rights) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, 
    • Part 3 amended the Intellectual Property (Exhaustion of Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, 
    • Part 4 amended the Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, 
    • Part 5 amended the Designs and International Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, and  
    • Part 6 amended the Patents (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
    Part 7 amended the Patents Act 1977 and Part 8 and the Schedule Council Regulation (EC) No 469/2009, Regulation EU) No 2019/933 and the Patent Rules 2007.

    Implementation of Title IV

    Title IV of the withdrawal agreement is implemented as follows:

    EU Trade Marks: Reg 2 and Sched 1 of The Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 as amended by The Intellectual Property (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020  implement the provisions of arts 54 and 55 of the withdrawal agreement relating to EU trade marks.  Sched. 1 of the Regulations inserts a new s.52A and Sched 2A into the Trade Marks Act 1994.  They require an existing EU trade mark to be treated as registered under the Act.  Para 2 provides an opt-out for those who do not want a national trade mark. Part 3 governs applications for European Union trade marks which are pending on 31 Dec 2018.  

    International Trade Marks Designating the EU: Reg 6 of The Designs and International Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 as amended implements art 56 of the withdrawal agreement by inserting a new s.54A and Sched 2B into the Act.  S. 54A provides for international trade marks designating the EU to be treated as though they had been registered under the Trade Marks Act 1994.  Sched 2B establishes a procedure for the registration of such marks as UK trade marks as well as certain other matters including an opt-out. 

    Registered Community Designs:  Reg 5 and Sched. 3 of The Designs and International Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 implement the provisions of arts 54 and 55 of the withdrawal agreement relating to registered Community designs.  Para 2 of Sched. 3 inserts a new s.12A and a new s.12B into the Registered Designs Act 1949.  Para 3 inserts a new Sched 1A and a new Sched 1B into the Act.  S.12A and Sched 1A provide for existing registered Community designs to be treated as designs registered under the 1949 Act. S.12B and Sched 1B provide for international designs designating the EU are to be treated as though they had been registered under the 1949 Act. 

    Continuing Unregistered Community Designs:  Reg 4 (3) and Sched 2, of The Designs and International Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 transpose into the laws of the UK the requirement in art 57 of the withdrawal agreement that designs that had been protected as UCD before the 31 Dec 2020 will continue to be protected afterwards. Any UCD that came into being before 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020 will continue to be protected in the UK for the remainder of its term as a continuing unregistered Community design”.  Reg 4 (3) (a) and Part 1 of Sched. 2 of the 2019 Regulations anend the provisions of the Community Design Regulation that relate to unregistered Community designs.  Reg 4 (3) (b) and Part 2 of Sched. 2 further amend  The Community Design Regulations 2005 (SI 2005 No 2339).

    Supplementary Unregistered Designs:  The obligation in art 57 of the withdrawal agreement to protect new designs having individual character that come into being after 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020 by a new UK intellectual property right to be known as the "supplementary unregistered design" is implemented by reg 3 and Sched. 1 of The Designs and International Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.  Part 1 of Sched. 1 amends the Community Design Directive and Part 2 The Community Design Regulations.

    Databases:  No new legislation was required to preserve The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 (SI 1997 No 3032) in accordance with art 58 of the withdrawal agreement, but that statutory instrument has been amended by reg 28 of The Intellectual Property (Copyright and Related Rights) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

    Plant Varieties:  The requirement in art 54 (1) (c) of the withdrawal agreement that the holder of a Community plant variety right granted pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/942 shall become the holder of a plant variety right in the United Kingdom for the same plant variety is implemented by reg 3 (2) of The Plant Breeders’ Rights (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.  The Regulations revoke Regulation 2100/942 and provide for the registration of Community plant variety rights as UK plant breeders' rights and the processing of pending applications for Community rights. The statutory instrument also amends the Plant Varieties Act 1997 and regulations made under that Act.

    Geographical Indications:  Art 54 (2) of the withdrawal agreement requires the UK to continue to protect protected designations of origin, protected geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed which are protected throughout the EU by Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1–29).  That requirement is implemented by The Agricultural Products, Food and Drink (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2009 No 1366).  The regulations amend Regulation 1151/2012.  I discussed the UK scheme in Geographical Indications in the UK after 31 Dec 2020 in NIPC Law on 30 Sept 2020 and in The New Protected Food Names Scheme as it will apply in Wales on 26 Oct 2020 in NIPC Wales.

    Supplementary Protection Certificates:   Such certificates protect the active ingredients of patented pharmaceutical or plant protection products. for up to 5 years (and in the case of products used to treat children's diseases an extra 6 months)  from the expiry of a patent for such a product. Art 60 (1) of the withdrawal agreement provides for Regulation (EC) No 1610/96 and Regulation (EC) 469/2009 to continue to apply to applications for SPCs lodged before 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020.  That provision is implemented by the incorporation of those regulations into the laws of the UK and their amendment by Part 6 and Part 8 of The Patents (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 as amended.   Further amendments have been made by The Intellectual Property (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.

    Exhaustion of Rights:  Art 61 of the withdrawal agreement is implemented by the Intellectual Property (Exhaustion of Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 as amended by The Intellectual Property (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.

    The Intellectual Property Office's news story Intellectual property after 1 January 2021 summarize the changes brought about by this legislation.

    Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court

    No provision was made for the unitary patent or the Unified Patent Court in the withdrawal agreement even though such a patent and court had been longstanding objectives of British diplomacy and London was to have hosted part of the Central Division of the Court of First Instance and had fitted out the accommodation for such a court at some expenses. For several years after the referendum, the government argued that it should be possible for the UK to participate in the project as the Unified Patent Court Agreement was an international treaty outside the scope of the European Union.   Mr Boris Johnson MP in his role as Foreign Secretary actually deposited an instrument of ratification of the Agreement on 26 April 2018 (see British Ratification of the UPC Agreement - Possibly the best thing to happen on World Intellectual Property Day  26 April 2018 NIPC News).  Less than 2 years afterwards the government changed its mind and withdrew from the project on 20 July 2020 (see Volte Face on the Unified Patent Court 29 Feb 2020 NIPC News and Unified Patent Court Ratification Bill clears Lower House of the German Federal Parliament  30 Nov 2020).

    Trade and Cooperation Agreement

    On 24 Dec 2020, negotiators for the European Commission and the British government concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement to govern the UK's future relationship with the EU.  The Agreement was ratified by the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020 on 30 Dec 2020.   Title V of Part Two of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement contained a large number of provisions relating to IP which I discussed in The IP Provisions of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement on 30 Dec 2020.  However, none of those provisions appears to require implementing legislation for the time being and there was no mention of intellectual property in the Future Relationship Act.

    Further Information

    I intend to give a talk on these provisions over Zoom between 16:30 and 18:00 on Tuesday 26 Jan 2021.  This talk will be free but attendees should register in advance here.  Anyone wishing to discuss this article or any of its contents may call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during normal office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

    Sunday, 3 January 2021

    Brexit Briefing December 2020

    Standard YouTube Licence



    Much to the surprise of many commentators, the UK concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union on Christmas eve to govern the parties' future relationship from 31 Dec 2020. I discussed it in outline in The Draft EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: What We Know So Far on 26 Dec 2020. It was a great deal better than nothing but it would not have satisfied anybody who might have been hoping for a licence to undercut manufacturers and farmers on the Continent by abandoning EU product safety, environmental and employment safeguards. Her Majesty's government is, of course, free to do any of those things but if it does it will face tariffs or other countermeasures from the EU.  A lot of people in the UK from fishermen to financial services providers have expressed dismay at the deal.

    The agreement required primary legislation for implementation and the 40 clause European Union (Future Relationship) Bill with its 6 schedules amounting to 80 pages cleared all its parliamentary stages in a single day.  The other important piece of primary legislation was the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020.  The provisions to which the EU and parliamentarians of all parties objected which I mentioned in The United Kingdom Internal Market Bill 19 Sept 2020 were dropped.

    So now the legislative framework is in place in international and national law.  The terms of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union are set out in the Withdrawal Agreement (Agreement on the withdrawal of theUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Nothern Ireland from the European Union and the European AtomicEnergy Community).   The provisions relating to the transition or implementation period lapsed at 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020 but the others remain in force.

    These include the continued legal protection of intellectual assets that were protected by EU law such as registered Community designs and EU trade mark by UK intellectual property rights.  The Withdrawal Agreement was ratified and implemented by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 though the legislation amending the Registered Designs Act 1949, the Patents Act 1977, Thw. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Trade Marks Act 1994 had already been made in anticipation of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU without agreement. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement contained a number of provisions relating to intellectual property which I discussed in The IP Provisions of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement on 30 Dec 2020 but these will not require legislation in the immediate future.

    New provisions for the resolution of disputes between the UK and the EU over the interpretation and application of the Withdrawal Agreement came into force at 23:00 on 31 Dec 2020 which I discussed in Dispute Resolution under the Withdrawal Agreement  31 Dec 2020.  Some matters will be reserved to the Court of Justice of the European Union notwithstanding the UK's departure from the EU but most will be resolved through consultation and cooperations with arbitration as a last resort.

    Finally, the Department for International Trade has reported trade agreements with Canada, Keneffeya, Singapore, Turkey and Vietnam which appear to roll over agreements that those countries have made with the EU in December.

    Anyone wishing to discuss this article or the UK's new trading environment generally should call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact page.

    UPC Court of Appeal upholds the Mannheim Local Division's Decision on the Court's Jurisdiction in Fujifilm v Kodak

    Musée de l'Élysée ,   Lausanne, World's First Photographic Museum Author Sandro Senn   Licence CC BY-SA 3.0   Source Wikimedia Commo...